Adapted from the lectures of (Session 360)
Futuwwa, like a radiant jewel in the crown of Islamic mysticism, has long been the subject of reflections by mystics and philosophers. This concept, which has manifested in the mirror of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Infallibles, refers not only to superficial honours but to a conscious love that flows in the pursuit of the good of others and the rectification of society. The present lecture, drawn from the words of , critically and profoundly addresses futuwwa as a knowledge-based love, disassociating itself from erroneous definitions such as mercantilism and mendicancy.
defines futuwwa as a conscious love that flows in the pursuit of another's good and reform, not as an obligatory act or as a pursuit of profit. He critiques Khwaja Abdullah Ansari's definition of futuwwa in its second degree, which states: "And similarly, your honouring of one who harms you, for you see that he has fulfilled the right of your soul and brought you to what your Lord has destined for you according to the judgement of the truth." (Translation). According to , honouring the one who harms you due to ultimate benefit (such as salvation from death) is not futuwwa, but rather mercantilism, as it is not based on a sincere goodwill (the goodness of the agents intent). With a clear metaphor, he elaborates this critique: if someone breaks your leg and that injury prevents your death, honouring them because of the ultimate benefit (saving your life) is not a noble act, but a business transaction. This perspective, like a mirror, reflects the distinction between pure intention and profit-seeking. From the standpoint of Islamic ethics, this critique aligns with Al-Ghazali's perspective on pure intent and Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi's view on practical wisdom. For well-educated audiences, this discussion can be compared with Kant's theory of good will or moral psychology. His biting humour, such as "Shall we thank Shimmer too?", makes the critique both palpable and engaging for the audience.
According to , futuwwa is a conscious love that should result in the good and reform of others, not exploitation or corruption. He emphasises that futuwwa is boundless, but it is always directed towards the good, and is free from mendicancy (blind love) and mercantilism (love for profit). For instance, if a murderers father is forgiven and this forgiveness leads to the murderers reform, it is noble. However, if it leads to a repetition of the crime, it is not good. This definition, like a clear river, flows towards mystical truth and is in harmony with the sayings of the Infallibles, such as Imam Sadiq's (A.S.) statement: "Futuwwa is not in debauchery and corruption." (al-Ma'ani al-Akhbar, Sheikh Saduq). From the perspective of social psychology, this discussion can be compared with social exchange theory, or in terms of ethical philosophy, with Aristotles concept of moderation. His humorous metaphor, "You forgave the murderer, then gave him a shop and a mother!", beautifully clarifies this concept.
This verse links futuwwa to conscious forgiveness and reform. It encapsulates the essence of futuwwa as a conscious, reformative love, and further enriches our understanding of this concept.
considers knowledge to be the greatest trait of nobility, asserting that without the discernment of good and evil, futuwwa will lead to either misguided actions or "premature nobility." He compares courage (acting with knowledge) and recklessness (acting without knowledge), demonstrating that futuwwa requires conscious discernment. For example, if love for a murderer leads to his reform, it is noble; however, if it results in repeated harm, it is misguided. This perspective acts as a beacon in the darkness, illuminating the path of futuwwa. It is in alignment with Islamic philosophy, such as Ibn Sinas view on practical intellect, and practical mysticism, as articulated by Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi. For well-educated audiences, this discussion can be analysed with Descartes epistemology or decision-making psychology. His humour, "Without knowledge, you will die prematurely!" makes the concept both engaging and accessible to the audience.
critiques Khwaja Abdullah Ansaris definition that justifies honouring one who harms you due to the ultimate benefit (such as salvation from death). According to him, this benefit is a result of divine destiny (the goodness of the event), not the intention of the agent (the goodness of the agents intent). Honouring such a person is mercantilism, not nobility. For instance, if someone breaks your leg and this injury prevents your death, the benefit is from divine providence, not the agents intention, and honouring them is not futuwwa. This critique, like a sharp sword, separates the essence of futuwwa from mercantilism. From the standpoint of Islamic ethics, this view aligns with Mulla Sadras philosophy on intention. For well-educated audiences, this critique can be analysed through Kierkegaards concept of altruistic intention or philosophy of action. His humorous example, "A bad woman did something, you became a mystic, and now you thank her?" makes the critique both vivid and entertaining.
Nikounam, referring to the noble verse And in the law of retribution there is life for you, O people of understanding (Al-Baqarah 2:179), emphasizes that both futuwah and qisas can serve as tools for social good, though they are conditional. In his view, a believer should, with discernment, sometimes forgive and sometimes execute retribution, depending on which leads to the greater social benefit. For instance, if forgiving a murderer leads to his reform, this is futuwah; however, if it results in the repetition of the crime, then qisas is the greater good. This perspective, akin to a precise scale, demonstrates a balance between forgiveness and justice. From the standpoint of Shi'a jurisprudence, this discourse aligns with Khoeis views on qisas, while from a mystical perspective, it resonates with Ghazalis philosophy on the wisdom of action. For educated audiences, this topic can be analysed through John Rawlss theory of justice or through the lens of the sociology of religion. His example, such as If you do not forgive the killer, his brother will kill him! renders the concept tangible.
Nikounam, with a sharp critique of the begging culture in society, believes that compassion without knowledge is akin to aiding a professional beggar, leading to misguidance and corruption. He identifies two primary causes of begging culture: systemic oppression (failure to pay the rights of the poor) and misplaced compassion. For example, a worker who, due to injury, is unable to work may become a beggar because of the lack of social support, and blind mercy also empowers professional beggars. This critique, like a wake-up call, invites society to reflect on the roots of poverty. From a sociological perspective, this argument aligns with Pierre Bourdieus theory of the reproduction of inequality. For educated audiences, this issue can be analysed through the sociology of development or social ethics. His satirical remark, Beggars go to university and still curse me! makes this critique both engaging and relatable.
Nikounam views futuwah as a modern, knowledge-oriented practice that is far removed from the antics of the ascetic or the merchants trade. He considers practical mysticism as a call to discernment and correction, rather than blind love or opportunism. For example, a religious scholar must, with sharp discernment, determine where forgiveness serves the greater good and where retribution is necessary. This perspective, like a fresh breeze, steers mysticism towards a knowledge-based modernity. From the perspective of contemporary mysticism, this discourse aligns with Allameh Tabatabais views on the connection between mysticism and society. For educated audiences, this topic can be explored through the philosophy of mysticism, such as Heideggers notion of authentic action, or the sociology of religion. His humorous remark, The ascetic's antics wont fix anything! clarifies and makes the concept engaging.
Nikounam's lecture on the concept of futuwah, like a radiant light, illuminates the truth of this concept in the mirror of the Holy Qur'an, Hadith, and Islamic mysticism. Futuwah is a conscious form of compassion that flows in pursuit of the good and the reform of others, far removed from profiteering, asceticism, and misguidance. The critique of Khwajah Abdullah Ansaris definition, emphasis on knowledge, and call for a modern mysticism reflect the profound mystical, philosophical, and sociological insight of the speaker. The Quranic and hadith references, along with humorous illustrations such as Shall we thank Shimmer for his efforts?, make these concepts comprehensible for both general and specialized audiences. This text provides a valuable resource for scholars in theology, mysticism, philosophy, and sociology, offering a rich ground for interdisciplinary analysis. With the oversight of Sadegh Khademi
